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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 08-3445
____________
JAMES JACKMAN,
Appellant,
v.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF FELIX PITTERSON,
Appellee.
____________
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE
DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS,
APPELLATE DIVISION
(D.C. Crim. No. 04-cv-00147)
Chief Judge: Honorable Curtis V. Gomez
District Judge: Honorable Stanley S. Brotman
Superior Court Judge: Honorable Leon A. Kendall
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 21, 2009
Before: BARRY, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 01, 2009)

OPINION OF THE COURT
____________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
James Jackman appeals the District Court’s judgment affirming the decision of the
Virgin Islands Superior Court (Territorial Court). We will affirm.
I.
Because we write exclusively for the parties, we recount only the facts necessary to
our decision.
This case arises from a probate dispute in which Jackman contests the Estate of
Felix Pitterson’s rejection of his property claim. Jackman contends that he is entitled to
an unspecified parcel of land under the equitable doctrine of past performance. The
Territorial Court (sitting in probate) first granted Jackman’s claim but reserved the issue
of the portion of the property to be awarded, pending additional briefing. The Court then
reversed itself, sua sponte, holding that, without adequate evidence as to the portion of
the property claimed by Jackman, his claim must fail.
Jackman argues that the Territorial Court: (1) erred by sua sponte reversing itself
and denying his property claim; and (2) wrongfully ordered his eviction from the
property. On appeal, the District Court denied Jackman’s motion to stay his eviction from
Pitterson’s property after concluding that his claim was unfounded. Jackman filed this
timely appeal.
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II.
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the District Court was correct to
affirm the Territorial Court’s denial of Jackman’s property claim, albeit for the wrong
reason. Although we agree with the District Court and the Territorial Court that
Jackman’s claim fails on the merits,1 the District Court should not have reached the merits
because Jackman failed to satisfy the evidentiary standard of 15 V.I.C. § 395.
Section 395 provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o claim which has been rejected by
the executor or administrator . . . shall be allowed by the court, except upon some
competent or satisfactory evidence other than the testimony of the claimant.” (emphasis
added).
Thus, claims against an estate that are not corroborated by evidence other than a
claimant’s testimony will be denied. See, e.g., In re Estate of Erikson, Probate No. 72/14
1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5911 (D.V.I. Nov. 7, 1974); In re Estate of Dennis, Probate No.
39/1973 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6234 (D.V.I. Oct. 18, 1974).
Here, the Territorial Court initially granted Jackman’s property claim by relying
almost exclusively on Jackman’s uncorroborated testimony at trial. Indeed, besides
Jackman’s extensive testimony, the record is devoid of any evidence to establish that

1

Jackman’s testimony at trial conflicted with the evidence presented insofar as his
testimony concerning an alleged implied agreement between himself and Pitterson was
not supported by their written contract. Even more fundamentally, Jackman’s inability to
describe the size, location, and other essential characteristics of the land in question
doomed his claim.
3

Jackman and Pitterson had an agreement as to a specific parcel of land. In light of the
clear language of 15 V.I.C. § 395, the Territorial Court should not have made factual
findings based on Jackman’s testimony alone, and we will affirm the judgment of the
District Court as to Jackman’s property claim on that basis. Finally, because, as discussed
above, Jackman did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim, the
District Court did not err in denying Jackman’s motion to stay his removal from the
property.
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